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doi:10.1016/j.ajic.2012.02.033Background: A major outbreak of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) occurred in loca-
tions C and Z of our hospital and lasted for several years. It affected 1,230 patients and 153 personnel.
Methods: Outbreak management was installed according to the Dutch “search and destroy” policy. A
rapid, high-throughput method for molecular screening of potential MRSA carriers was implemented.
Outbreak isolates were retrospectively genotyped by pulsed field gel electrophoresis. Costs of molecular
screening were compared with screening by culture.
Results: Genotyping results revealed 4 distinct epidemic MRSA clones. Three were present in hospital C.
Because of a merger of hospitals, these clones spread to hospital Z. Another clone of MRSA affected other
health care-related institutions in the region. Because of the implementation of strict containment
measures of the “search and destroy” policy, the annual number of tests decreased from 100,000 to
18,000. The disposables and reagents used in polymerase chain reaction technology are more expensive
than those of conventional methods. However, the clinical and economic benefits of fast results in regard
to expenses of the hospital clearly outweigh the higher costs of screening.
Conclusion: The implementation of a rapid, high-throughput molecular screening system greatly
contributed to the effectiveness of strict containment measures of the “search and destroy” policy. The
major epidemic clones of MRSA in the outbreak were eradicated by this strategy.
Copyright  2013 by the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology, Inc.
Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is, world-
wide, one of the most important pathogens known to frequently
cause nosocomial infections.1 The clonal spread of highly epidemic
MRSA strains within hospitals or between hospitals has been well
described.2,3 Outbreaks of MRSA in a hospital are often difficult to
control, and eradication of epidemics may take several years.4 In
The Netherlands, MRSA is approached by a “search and destroy”
policy that has proven to be successful.5,6 This policy has been
implemented in other countries as well.7 It has been shown that,
with extended infection control strategies of screening of patients
at admission and discharge, and screening of all health care
workers, outbreaks could be contained more rapidly., PhD, Molecular Diagnostics
tterdam, The Netherlands.
an der Zee).
tion for Professionals in InfectionWe experienced a major epidemic of MRSA in both locations, C
and Z, of our hospital, whichwas recognized inNovember 2001. This
particular strain of MRSA initially escaped detection because of its
very lowminimum inhibitory concentration for oxacillin. Using disc
diffusion, these strains were initially reported as methicillin-
sensitive S aureus. Consequently, this MRSA strain was able to
spread freely in our hospital and affected both patients and
personnel. Extensive measures were taken to control the epidemic,
aswas described byVanTrijp et al,8 covering hospital C from2002 to
2005. Here, we report the analysis of the epidemic over a time span
of 8 years. We report on the spread of epidemic clones in both
hospital locations and its spread to other health care-related facili-
ties in the region outside of our hospitals. We analyze the factors
contributing to the successful eradication of the epidemic clones.
Furthermore, we compare fully automated molecular screening for
MRSA with conventional culture and provide estimates of costs
controlling the outbreak. We show that the implementation of
molecular screening led to considerable hospital savings.Control and Epidemiology, Inc. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Table 1
Numbers of screening by culture and PCR from 2002 to 2009


























2002 10,508 53,773 1,124 24,738 374 96
2003 15,470 86,045 1,228 27,030 320 35
2004 14,954 83,634 7,650 16,830 97 5
2005 16,669 72,382 2,964 6,612 162 5
2006 15,618 72,515 566 1,231 1,073 101 28 1
2007 14,979 71,821 591 1,323 541 89 13 5
2008 3,907 16,716 751 1,631 325 42 72 2
2009 3,745 17,794 350 787 401 45 36 4
Total 1,230 153
NOTE. MRSA screen by PCR was implemented on March 16, 2005. Screening on admission and discharge of patients was abolished as from January 2008. Repeated screening
was counted.
A. van der Zee et al. / American Journal of Infection Control 41 (2013) 204-9 205MATERIALS AND METHODS
Samples and culture
From hospital personnel and patients, nose and throat swabs
were taken. In addition, perineum swabs were taken from patients,
and, if indicated, swabs from wounds, sputum, and catheters were
taken (Transwab, Medical Wire & Equipment Co Ltd, Corsham,
Wilts, England). No extra action or sampling was requested than
that medically indicated. Informed consent was not asked, and no
ethical approval was required, in conformity to the guidelines of the
Dutch Central Committee on Research involving Human Subjects
(www.healthlaw.nl/humsub.pdf).
To verify correct sampling, swabs were plated onto 5% sheep
blood agar to count commensal bacteria. To ensure compliance with
appropriate sampling, swabs should at least produce 15 colonies.
Therefore, when swabs produced less than 15 colonies, they were
rejected. In these cases, a repeat sample was requested. Subse-
quently, swabs were inoculated into 5 mL phenyl mannitol broth
containing ceftizoxime and aztreonam for overnight incubation.9
After >18-hour overnight incubation, 100 mL was plated onto
blood agar for MRSA isolation. All colonies suspected for S aureus
were tested by slide agglutination (Staphaurex Plus, Remel Europe
Ltd, Dartford, England). If positive, antibiotic sensitivity testing was
performed by agar diffusion (Isosensitest; Oxoid, Ltd, Hampshire,
United Kingdom), according to the Clinical and Laboratory Standards
Institute protocol. Strains that were resistant to oxacillin (from 1-1-
2006 cefoxitin; Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute, Wayne,
PA), erythromycin, or ciprofloxacin were tested by agglutination for
PBP2a (Oxoid). Colonies were sampled from the edge of the oxacillin
inhibition zone for penicillin binding protein PBP2a. If the slide test
was positive, Accuprobe (Gen-Probe Inc, SanDiego, CA) confirmation
of the determination of S aureuswas done. ConfirmedMRSA isolates
were sent to the National Institute of Public Health and the Envi-
ronment, Bilthoven, The Netherlands, for further genotyping by
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE).Implementation of molecular screening of MRSA
The measures taken to control the epidemic according to the
Dutch “search and destroy” protocol led to huge numbers of
specimens for screening. Consequently, automated methods were
sought to limit the laborious and time-consuming number of
cultures. A fully automated novel DNA extraction method for MRSA
was adopted that virtually prevents polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) inhibition and requires no centrifugation.10 The real-time
PCR-based detection was presented by extended multiplex PCR.10
This PCR specifically targets the junction between a conserved
open reading frame orfX in S aureus and the staphylococcal cassettechromosome containing the mecA gene (SCCmec). This system was
designed to detect MRSA DNA in enrichment broth incubated
overnight. The detection process was fully automated for high
through-put of clinical materials, and a digitized data work flow
was installed in 2005.Calculation of costs and savings
All data of screening by conventional culture and by automated
molecular methods were used to calculate the costs. Because the
PCR screening system was evaluated during 2005 and was fully
operational since 2006, data over the year 2005 were omitted from
the calculations.
The data listed in Table 1 were used to estimate costs: (1) the
number of MRSA screening tests per year per patients and
personnel, (2) the number of patients and personnel suspect for
infection or carriage of MRSA, and (3) the number of MRSA-positive
patients or health care workers.
The mean number of screening tests per patient was 4.9 and 2.2
per health care worker. Other parameters used were as follows:
 Culture screening costs, V7. Average cost of a conventional
culturewasV7 per sample. It included culturemedia, hands-on
time of technicians, and input of staff and administrative
personnel.
 PCR screening costs, V19. Costs include a 5-year period of
depreciation and maintenance of the fully automated extrac-
tion/PCR system and the cost of the proportion of positive PCRs
(10%, Table 1) that were subsequently subjected to culturing.
 Duration of culture screening, 5 days. Traditional culture takes
5 days before both a positive or a negative result is available
because oxacillin susceptibility tests have to be performed.
 Duration of PCR screening, 2 days. With PCR detection of the
MecA gene, a negative result can be obtained within 2 days.
PCR-positive screenings have to be cultured to determine
whether PCR positivity was due toMRSA or to a combination of
MSSA and coagulase negative Staphylococci.
 Duration positive patients isolation (culture), 20 days. Isolation
was ended when 3 subsequent cultures were negative.
 Duration positive patients isolation (PCR), 7 days.
 Isolation costs per day, V500
 HCW salary costs per day, V160
 Correction for patients, 15%. To provide a reliable overall cost
estimate, it was assumed that 15% of patients were involved.
The 15%was carefully derived to (1) minimize the effect of each
counted screening (repeated counting by consecutive screen-
ings of MRSA positive patients), (2) to compensate for cohort
isolation of patients, (3) to correct for admitted patients who
were not suspect for carrying MRSA.
Fig 1. The monthly incidence of MRSA among patients and personnel (as indicated) during and after the outbreak.
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The course of the epidemic
The outbreak of MRSA was initially recognized in November
2001, and soon a large number of colonized patients and hospital
personnel were detected (Fig 1). Because of the measures taken as
described previously,8 the number of new infections decreased
during the following 2 years (2002-2003), followed by a slight
increase in 2005. The slight increase in the number of infections in
2005 was probably due to increased spread of MRSA in health care
institutions in the region of the hospital as is shown in Figure 2 by
the increase in genotype 18. A further decline in the number of
infections in later years led to the level that was seen in our hospital
before the outbreak. An outbreak is definedwhen2 ormorepatients
share the same MRSA strain or by transmission of 1 MRSA strain
between2 ormorepatients. In fact, 3 epidemic strainswere found to
have spread in hospital C as was revealed by retrospective geno-
typing results andPFGE-type assignment. In 2002, PFGE types16, 37,
and 38 were the major clones in hospital C. Other MRSA genotypes
only disseminated minimally and were considered as bystanders.
Distribution of MRSA genotypes
We analyzed samples from both locations C, and Z, from other
hospitals in our region as well as various health care related insti-
tutions as nursing homes, care centres and general practitioners.
The distribution of major genotypes 16, 37, 38, and 18, is shown in
Figure 2. Of minor genotypes 98% was only seen once. Minor
genotypes were evenly distributed over locations C, Z, and X and
over time. The outbreak started in location C of our hospital (Fig 2).Because of a merger of hospital C and hospital Z in 2001, the
epidemic spread to location Z by lateral transfer of patients and
health care workers. It subsequently appeared to have spread to
other health care locations in the region. For example, MRSA
genotype 18 was present in 1 patient in 2002 in location C. It was
not recognized as an epidemic type of strain within hospital C
because it did not spread in this location. However, as is shown in
Figure 2, MRSA with PFGE genotype 18 appeared to be most
widespread and most persistent because its presence covered all
locations and years from 2002 to 2007. After 2004, the epidemic
clone of PFGE genotype 38 was no longer found. After 2005,
genotype 37 was eradicated and PFGE genotype 16 after 2006. After
2007, all the major epidemic clones could no longer be found. Many
MRSA strains were found because of new introductions with
a sporadically occurring genotype.
Analysis of costs and savings
The yearly numbers of MRSA screening among patients and
personnel are listed in Table 1, as well as the number of patients and
personnel who were suspect by PCR for infection or carriage of
MRSA and the number of positive cultures in each group. A
comparison of costs between screening by traditional culture and
by automated molecular method was carried out. The parameters
mentioned in the Materials and Methods section contribute to an
approximate figure of yearly savings in hospital costs (Table 2).
When screened by traditional culture, patients had to be kept in
isolation and/or were not allowed to be transferred or discharged
for at least 5 days, and personnel was sent home for at least 5 days
awaiting the outcome of the cultures. In case of a positive culture,
patients had to be kept in isolation for at least 20 days until cultures
Fig 2. Spread of major epidemic MRSA clones with indicated PFGE genotypes 16, 18, 37, and 38. C and Z comprise both locations of our hospital. X includes all other health care
facilities in our region.
Table 2
Calculations of costs and savings based on comparison of screening by culture and screening by PCR
Year
A B C D E F G
Costs test/patients Costs test/personnel Isolation costs/patients (15%) Absence costs/personnel
Savings/patients Savings/personnelCulture PCR Culture PCR Culture PCR Culture PCR
2002 V376,411 V173,166 V4,361,250 V169,440
2003 V602,315 V189,210 V6,161,250 V159,960
2004 V585,438 V117,810 V5,716,875 V919,800
2005 ND ND ND ND ND ND
2006 V507,605 V1,377,785 V8,617 V22,998 V6,828,875 V3,096,050 V455,200 V228,000 V2,862,645 V212,819
2007 V502,747 V1,364,599 V9,261 V24,706 V6,473,750 V2,759,000 V484,800 V321,920 V2,852,898 V147,435
2008 V117,012 V317,604 V11,417 V30,015 V1,869,375 V853,875 V605,600 V346,880 V814,908 V240,122
2009 V124,558 V338,086 V5,509 V14,301 V1,837,500 V868,500 V289,600 V238,720 V755,472 V42,088
Subtotal savings V7,285,923 V642,464
ND, not done.
NOTE. A and B: number of screenings (Table 1)  costs, respectively, culture and PCR, patients and personnel. C: [(number of patients eMRSA positives)  5 days  V500 
15%] þ number of positives  20 days  V500. D: [(number of patients e MRSA suspects)  2 days  V500  15%] þ (number of suspects e number of positives)  (2 þ 5
days)  V500  15%) þ (number of positives  10 days  V500). E: [(number of patients e MRSA positives)  5 days  V500] þ number of positives  20 days  V500.
F: [(number of patients eMRSA suspects)  2 days  V500]þ (number of suspects e number of positives)  (2 þ 5 days) V500) þ (number of positives  10 days V500).
G: (cost culture e cost PCR) þ (isolation/absence because of culture e isolation/absence because of PCR positives, culture confirmed MRSA suspects, PCR positives).
A. van der Zee et al. / American Journal of Infection Control 41 (2013) 204-9 207were 3 times negative, and personnel was not allowed to resume
work for at least 20 days.
With MRSA screening by automated PCR, negative results are
known after 2 days. PCR-positive results are considered suspect for
MRSA until proven by traditional culture. Patients suspect for MRSA
were therefore kept in isolation for 7 days. MRSA-positive results
from culturing were kept in isolation for at least 10 days until 3
negative PCR and/or cultures were obtained.
The time span required for each method to yield a result (5 or 2
days) thus contributes to saving hospital costs. Implementation ofMRSA screening by automated PCR was estimated to save a total of
V7.3 million in hospital costs for patients over the years 2006 to
2009 (Table 2). Savings involving personnel was estimated at
V642,000.
DISCUSSION
In 2002, the largest epidemic of MRSA known to have ever
occurred in The Netherlands, occurred in our hospital. The 2 loca-
tions C and Z are spaced by 1 km and merged in 2001 into 1
A. van der Zee et al. / American Journal of Infection Control 41 (2013) 204-9208organization. The outbreak started in hospital location C by a MRSA
strain with a methicillin-sensitive phenotype (PFGE type 16). It has
been shown by multilocus sequence typing12 that this particular
clone was found in Germany from 1993 and has since been
observed in various European countries.3,13
Subsequently, 2 more epidemic clones were found to be present
in hospital C (types 37 and 38), with phenotypes that differed from
each other and from type 16. It is not clear why these MRSA clones
could disseminate so fast. On the other hand, type 18 initially did
not spread. Although it was detected in a patient repeatedly
admitted to hospital C, this strain apparently lacked the capacity to
spread in location C or did not spread because of a low number of
contacts. This patient was discharged and received home care.
Because of the merger of hospital C and Z in 2001, patients and
personnel were transferred between 2 locations, and the outbreak
of MRSA subsequently shifted to location Z and also to health care
facilities outside of the hospital. In location Z, PFGE type 18, which
was not recognized as being epidemic in hospital C, was most
predominant. This finding suggests that, in case of an epidemic in 1
location, related institutions should also strictly abide to the
“search and destroy” policy to prevent these shifted outbreaks. This
also applies for workers who provide home care because results
suggest that MRSA PFGE type 18 may have been first transmitted
outside of the hospital.
Genotyping of MRSA presents a resource for identification of
epidemic clones and recognition of transmission routes. Genotyping
was performed by the reference laboratory of the National Institute
of Public Health and the Environment in The Netherlands, which
takes time before results are available. A local typing system for
MRSA and timely results could assist in defining a smaller group of
contacts tobe screenedand in localizationof environmental sources.
When the outbreak was recognized, the prevalence of MRSA in
the Dutch community was less than 1%.11 In addition to the
measures of the Dutch guideline for infection control, the following
measures were taken to contain the outbreak.
In 2002, the hospital board decided that all patients were to be
screened for the presence of MRSA on admission and on read-
mission if no previous negative culture result was available. In
addition, all patients were to be screened for MRSA on discharge.
The decisions were based on the following principles: (1) to
prevent newMRSA clones from entering the hospital, (2) to prevent
further spread to other institutions and to eliminate the concern of
other hospitals on the transfer of patients, and (3) to be able to
recognize patients at high risk for carrying MRSA on readmission.
In addition, strict measures were applied for personnel. Prefer-
ably, they were screened at the start of shifts, between shifts, and
when changing departments in the same shift.
In addition, the implementation of a rapid high-throughput
molecular MRSA screening system contributed to speed up
results. It markedly reduced the time of isolation of patients and
sick leave of personnel. As a result, the number of suspected
contacts was less and hence the number of necessary screening
tests and isolation days.
The huge number of screening tests led to very high costs for the
hospital and huge pressure on personnel. To be able to perform
screenings much faster and more efficiently, a high-throughput
molecular detection method was implemented for MRSA. Nega-
tive screening test results are known after overnight incubation and
automated PCR analysis. Isolation procedures for approximately
90% of patients can be omitted. According to the hygiene policy in
The Netherlands, patients at risk of being colonized with MRSA are
isolated in a closed single roomuntil negative cultures forMRSA are
available. In such cases, an earlier MRSA-negative result by a rapid
PCR-based screening test, as presented in this study, will help to
reduce patient isolation time and therefore the costs for thehospital. The same applies for health care workers, of which 90%
can resume their work in 2 days. In addition to limiting the costs, an
epidemic can be contained much faster. The rapid molecular
identification of MRSA proved to be of major importance for the
rapid eradication of the epidemic both in our hospitals and in the
region. In a model to quantify the effectiveness of different infec-
tion control measures,14 it has been shown that isolation of MRSA
carriers identified by clinical cultures was insufficient to control
MRSA. This finding indeed underscores the importance of rapid
diagnostic testing.
Outbreak control screening for MRSA has been shown to be
cost-effective in comparison with no containment measures.15,16
We compared the costs of automated molecular screening and
traditional screening cultures. The costs of automated PCR
screening are much higher than the costs of traditional culture.
Only when the number of patients to be screened is less than
approximately 500 per year, cost-effectiveness of automated PCR
screening diminishes compared with culture. When the number of
patients exceeds 500, the clinical and economic benefit of saving
time in regard to expenses of the hospital are in favor of rapid
automated molecular methodology.
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